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Abstract This paper estimates dynamic demand models for tobacco consumption
in Italy from 1871 to 2010. The empirical analysis is based on an entirely new data-
set. Because the tobacco sector was mostly managed by the state, rich and detailed
historical documentation is available. Price elasticities are estimated both for aggre-
gate tobacco consumption and its four major components (cigars, cigarettes, cut to-
bacco, and snuff) for three separate sub-periods: 1871–1913, 1919–1939, and
1946–2010. Elasticities consistently belong to a narrow set. We discuss the public
policy implications of a seemingly iso-elastic tobacco demand function.
Key words: Long run, tobacco consumption, price and income elasticity of
demand.
JEL codes: C22, D12, N43.
This paper offers a detailed quantitative account of secular trends in tobacco
consumption in Italy. The case of long-term tobacco consumption represents a
fascinating research topic for a number of reasons. First, the sector is very well
documented. Since the nineteenth century, the import, production, and sale of
tobacco in Italy have often been run by the government under a regime of
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public monopoly, which has led to very accurate official documents and bud-
get reports.1 Second, tobacco is typically a normal good and its consumption
generates habits. These two characteristics make its taxation particularly ap-
pealing for revenue-raising purposes. Third, policy perspectives and individual
attitudes towards the consumption of harmful goods have changed dramati-
cally over the last 150 years in most countries. Italy constitutes no exception.
Italian policy makers of the nineteenth century were constantly at work to in-
crease per-capita consumption of tobacco, which was a major source of state
revenue.2 While is it true that pioneering works such as Scalzi (1868)
highlighted the negative consequences of tobacco consumption on health, pub-
lic health concerns were not a social priority of the time, as it also emerges from
official documents.3 In addition, technical publications of a medical nature
were clearly not accessible to the typical illiterate Italian of the time. For both
reasons, it seems fair to claim that most consumers were for a long time un-
aware of the negative effects of tobacco consumption on health.
Today, tobacco is widely recognized as a harmful good.4 When did things
change? The turning point in the way contemporary societies consider to-
bacco consumption is conventionally identified with the publication of the
first Surgeon General’s Report of 1964 (U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare 1964).
The Surgeon General’s report stressed, for the first time in an official pub-
lication, the existence of a causal relationship between smoking and lung
cancer. The report’s impact was enormous and its practical effects immedi-
ate, as the declining trend in per-capita consumption suggests (figure 1).
Figure 1 Per-capita consumption of tobacco in the United States, 1880–1995 (pounds)
Source: National Cancer Institute (1998).
1Madsen (1916) examined the financial and industrial results obtained from the production and sale of
tobacco with a special focus on those countries—France, Italy, Austria, Japan, Spain, and Sweden—with
a regime of public monopoly.
2Public revenues from sales of tobacco accounted for some 10% of total public revenues (Ciccarelli 2012).
In an 1878 report to the Parliament (Atti Parlamentari 1878), the Italian Minister of Finance Agostino
Magliani argued that per-capita consumption of manufactured tobacco in Italy (about 0.6 kilograms) was
still too low when compared to that of other European countries (about 2.5 in Belgium, 1.5 in Germany,
and 0.8 in France).
3In a parliamentary address delivered in 1907, Prime Minister Giolitti refused to contemplate banning
young people from smoking (as had been done in Japan) on the grounds that it “would have the immedi-
ate effect of making them all smoke, just to enjoy breaking the law with little risk of getting caught.” Atti
Parlamentari (1907).
4World Health Organization (2011).
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There is general agreement in the medical literature (Warner 2014; Alberg,
Shopland and Cummings 2014; Cummings and Proctor 2014) on the funda-
mental contribution of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report to the decline of
the social acceptance of smoking through the advent of legal restrictions on
smoking in public spaces, mass media counter-marketing campaigns, and
higher taxes on cigarettes. The first cautionary labels had appeared on ciga-
rette packs by 1966. In 1967, anti-smoking advertisements began to air on
television. And in 1971, cigarette advertising was banned on television and
radio.
The echoes of the report eventually reached Italian policy makers too, and
tobacco legislation was updated accordingly. By the end of January 1964,
members of the Italian Parliament had asked the government to consider
the immediate suspension of any form of advertisement for tobacco “in the
light of the recent Terry Report”.5 Since the mid 1970s, smoking in public
places has been banned by law; and fines on the advertising of tobacco
products, an illegal activity since the early 1960s, rose considerably after
1983. Tobacco packaging warnings were introduced in 1990.6 The most re-
cent legislation (a law passed in 2003, that came into force in 2005) has pro-
hibited smoking in workplaces, bars, and restaurants. Finally, since January
2013, selling tobacco products to individuals under the age of 18 has been
declared illegal.7
This change of perspective has produced a public policy tradeoff and an
economic puzzle. While increasing tobacco consumption is desirable to in-
crease private revenue from sales and public revenue from taxation, decreas-
ing tobacco consumption is desirable for reducing social and external costs
from smoking. Whether it is possible to control both tobacco consumption
and its negative effects and continue to rely on tobacco taxation as a source of
public revenues depends on the relationship between demand and price.
This paper offers the following contributions to the literature on tobacco
consumption. First, we build a new dataset covering 150 years. Second, we
estimate price and income elasticities, both for aggregate tobacco and its
four major components, for three separate sub-periods: 1871–1913, 1919–
1939, and 1946–2010. We find long-run price elasticities of demand to be sta-
ble in the range 0.62 to 0.51 over the years 1871 to 2010. This result is in
line with literature referring to more recent decades. Our findings open up
the menu of options available to the policy maker facing the problem of
tighter budget constraints in times of decreasing tobacco consumption.
5Chambers of Deputy, Parliamentary Proceedings, Fourth Legislature, Session 30 January 1964,
Discussions, 4698–9. Available at: http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg04/lavori/stenografici/sed0090/
sed0090.pdf. It is also interesting to note that the February 1965 issue of “Bollettino di Informazioni”,
the official magazine of the national association of the managers of tobacco monopoly warehouses, reports
that “After the explosion of the Terry report bomb, clearly relating tobacco and cancer”, the American
government is considering introducing cigarette packet warnings and limitations to advertising to dis-
courage smoking.
6The recent legislation on tobacco includes Law no. 584, 11 November 1975 (banning tobacco in public
places and transport); Law no. 428, 29 December 1990 (tobacco packaging warnings); Law no. 3, 16
January 2003, the so called “Sirchia law” after the then Minister of Health (banning tobacco in workpla-
ces, bars and restaurants, in force as of 10 January 2005). The annual reports of the Istituto Superiore
di Sanita (ISS, Italian National Health Service) provide rich details on the matter. These reports are
available at http://www.iss.it/fumo (last accessed, March 2015).
7The most recent legislation concerns the e-cigarettes phenomenon. E-cigarettes are essentially a battery-
powered cartridge that heats a liquid solution with various flavours (with or without nicotine); these
devices are gaining increasing popularity among Italians.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of
the literature, followed by a section that introduces the 1871–2010 tobacco
dataset. In the following section we estimate both the price and income elas-
ticities of demand for aggregate tobacco and its four major components. The
next section discusses the public policy implications of the results, and the fi-
nal section concludes.
Literature Review
Schoenberg (1933) is credited with providing the first estimate of the de-
mand function for cigarettes. In its early stages, the econometrics of tobacco
mainly consisted of estimating static demand equations. Since the end of the
1950s, most studies on cigarette demand have explicitly addressed the ad-
dictive nature of smoking; this has led to the introduction of dynamic
aspects in the empirical specification. The main consequences of modeling
addiction is that the short- and long-run price elasticities of demand can be
rather different, because the dependence of current consumption on past
consumption implies a lagged demand response to a current price change.
In myopic addiction or habit persistence models, for example, current to-
bacco consumption depends on past consumption, while the impact of cur-
rent and past choices on future consumption decisions is ignored. Empirical
applications of myopic addiction models (Baltagi and Levin 1986, 1992) are
mostly based on the works of Houthakker and Taylor (1966) and Pollack
(1970); a review is provided by Chaloupka and Warner (2000). Rational ad-
diction models (Becker and Murphy 1988) acknowledge that rational con-
sumers are aware of their addiction and adjust their long-term choices in an
optimal way. The crucial implication is that current smoking depends not
only on past consumption levels but also on future expected ones, giving
rise to long-run elasticities that are usually greater than those estimated
from myopic models. Tests of the rational addiction model were initiated by
Becker et al. (1990, 1994) on aggregate data, and by Chaloupka (1991) on in-
dividual data, and have been followed by a sizeable body of empirical litera-
ture.8 Auld and Grootendorst (2004) showed, though, that aggregate data
tend to produce spurious evidence in favor of addiction because they cannot
discriminate between addiction and simple correlation in the consumption
series. For this reason, addiction models should be estimated on individual
data and are therefore not considered in the present study. We instead focus
on the information content of aggregate data for an extremely long investi-
gation period.
Turning to studies on tobacco consumption in Italy, the pioneering study
with a modern statistical approach is that of Manera (1963), who estimates a
static demand model for tobacco with annual time series data covering the
period 1900 to 1960. More recent works tend to highlight the addictive na-
ture of tobacco and extend the analysis to a dynamic framework. Tiezzi
(2005) estimates a dynamic model of the demand for tobacco using both
(pseudo) panel data at the regional level for the years 1972 to 2000, and ag-
gregate time series data at the national level on tobacco expenditure for the
years 1960 to 2002. Pierani and Tiezzi (2009) consider the joint consumption
of tobacco and alcohol using a set of aggregate annual data covering the
8Reviews are provided, among others, by Chaloupka and Warner (2000), Gallet and List (2003),
Farrelly, Pechacek, and Chaloupka (2005), and Adda and Cornaglia (2006).
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period 1960 to 2002. Other studies consider the demand for tobacco within a
demand system approach that uses weak separability for the grouping of
goods (Caiumi 1993; Jones and Giannoni Mazzi 1996; Rizzi 2000; Rizzi and
Balli 2002).
A recent strand of literature focuses on the nineteenth century. Ciccarelli
(2012) describes the relevant historical sources and provides statistical
reconstructions of annual regional tobacco consumption in both physical
and monetary terms from 1871 to 1913. Ciccarelli and De Fraja (2014) esti-
mate the demand for tobacco in post-unification Italy using annual data at
the provincial level, while Ciccarelli and Elhorst (2017) estimate a spatial dy-
namic panel data model of early cigarettes diffusion in Italy.
The current literature on tobacco consumption in Italy is thus character-
ized by very heterogeneous data, ranging from micro to annual aggregate
(sales) data and a variety of econometric models. As a consequence, the em-
pirical findings are often difficult to compare.9 One contribution of this
study is to provide an estimate of the demand for tobacco from a very long-
run perspective, using the same estimation approach applied to carefully
reconstructed homogeneous time series data.
The Evolution of the Institutional Settings and the
New Tobacco Dataset
Long-run statistical reconstructions of economic indicators are often diffi-
cult given the paucity of historical information available. The case of tobacco
consumption in Italy constitutes an exception, and is explained by the tem-
poral evolution of the institutional settings behind the tobacco industry, es-
sentially reflecting the rise and decline of state intervention over the last 150
years.10
The data used in this work refer to the total annual consumption of to-
bacco and its major components (snuff, cut tobacco, cigars and cigarettes), in
both physical (kilograms) and monetary (Lire/Euro) terms. The time period
covered runs from 1871 to 2010. Data from 1871 to 1983 were collected from
the annual budget reports of the various institutions (Regıa Cointeressata
(co-directorship of Tobacco Production) 1869 to 1883, Azienda dei Tabacchi
(Tobacco Company) 1884 to 1927, AAMS 1928 to 1983) that were from time
to time charged with managing the tobacco business. The annual budget
reports share a homogeneous structure and contain sales figures referring to
both current and previous years, making it easier to preserve the temporal
homogeneity of the time series being reconstructed.
Two points need be clarified. First, the proposed “consumption” data are
actually (legal) sales data, referring to ordinary sales of manufactured to-
bacco for consumption in Italy. These data refer to the cash payments made
by authorized dealers (tabaccai) when buying snuff, cut tobacco, cigars, and
cigarettes at the monopoly sale warehouses distributed over the Italian terri-
tory. The sales considered in our dataset do not include those made at spe-
cial prices to privileged categories (such as merchant and armed sailors,
diplomats, and other minority groups). Furthermore, the sales are those “for
9The need for a meta-analysis comparing the heterogeneous results of the literature concerning the price
elasticity of the demand for tobacco motivated the contribution by Gallet and List (2003).
10Vetritto (2005) provides a detailed long-run account of the legal and institutional setting of the tobacco
sector in Italy.
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domestic consumption”, as sales of manufactured tobacco to foreign coun-
tries (exports) are excluded.
The last official budget report by the AAMS was published in 1983.11 For
the period 1984 to 2010, we obtained the data through personal communica-
tion with two institutions: the Federazione Italiana Tabaccai, the national asso-
ciation of Italian tobacconists (FIT), and the AAMS.12 The FIT dataset
includes annual data for 1970 to 2000 on aggregate tobacco consumption in
both physical and monetary terms. Aggregate tobacco is also disaggregated
into its four major components (snuff, cut tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes).
The AAMS dataset includes exactly the same information, but for the years
1994 to 2010. We were at least able to perform a set of reassuring consistency
checks.13 The tobacco dataset used in this paper borrows the quantitative in-
formation for the years 1983 to 1993 from the FIT dataset, and data for the
years 1994 to 2010 from the AAMS dataset.
The full dataset (see the online supplementary appendix) ideally covers the
period 1871 to 2010, and includes ten annual time series on tobacco consump-
tion: two series refer to aggregate tobacco (per-capita physical consumption
and real price); the remaining series refer to the per-capita consumption and
real price of tobacco’s four major components. Two additional variables enter
the dataset: real income, and real private consumption expenditure. Due to
the timing of the twoWorld Wars, three sub-periods were selected for the em-
pirical analysis: 1871 to 1913; 1919 to 1939; 1946 to 2010.
The real price of tobacco was computed by deflating its nominal price by
the ISTAT consumer price index (1913¼1).14 The nominal price of tobacco is
in fact its unit value, evaluated by dividing the nominal expenditure on to-
bacco by the corresponding physical consumption. Real income was
obtained by deflating Baffigi’s GDP series (2011) by the CPI provided by
ISTAT (2011). Total current expenditure for private consumption is also
taken from Baffigi (2011). All estimations use per-capita variables. Annual
1871 to 2010 population figures refer to individuals aged 15 or over and
were obtained by a linear interpolation of census data.15
Figure 2 illustrates secular trends of per-capita tobacco consumption (C),
of its real price (P), and real income (Y) normalized by their own means.
From end to end, per-capita consumption doubled, rising from about one to
about two kilograms. But the story is not one of a steady increase. Per-capita
consumption declined from 1871 to 1913; it then fluctuated widely around a
constant mean in the inter-war period, to rise at an unprecedented pace
11However, the accompanying text is typically brief and does not allow one to reconstruct temporally ho-
mogeneous series of aggregate tobacco consumption and, a fortiori, of their major components. Annual
reports of the AAMS for selected years are available at http://www.aams.gov.it/site.php?id¼2455.
12To get an idea of the wide diffusion over the Italian territory of the FIT network, consider that in the
year 2000 there were about 60,000 authorized dealers (tabaccai). Given a national territory (net of for-
ests) of around 233,000 square kilometers, the territorial density of tobacco shops (tabaccai) is quite high
(60/233).
13First, we compared the 1970 to 1983 FIT data against those reported in the official standard annual
budgets of the AAMS. The comparison was made separately for each component of total tobacco sales
(snuff, cut tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes), in both physical and monetary terms, separately by years.
Second, we compared the AAMS data against the FIT data on total sales of tobacco for the years 1980 to
1994. Finally, we compared the 1984 to 2010 data against the figures published annually by ISTAT
(Italian National Institute of Statistics).
14The consumer price index (1913¼1) is reported in Istat (2011).
15Data and intermediate estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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from 1945 to 1985, when it reached its highest level ever.16 The positive trend
was reversed in the early 1980s, and from 1985 onwards per-capita consump-
tion declined to the level of the 1970s.17 Moreover, there is a general negative
relationship between tobacco prices and consumption levels. This regularity is
not obvious when dealing with goods like tobacco, triggering habits or addic-
tions, and it corroborates our choice to specify demand functions that do not
explicitly account for addiction.18 Comparing Figures 1 and 2, two points
emerge. First, a long-term decline in per-capita tobacco consumption occurred
both in the United States and in Italy after almost one century of consumption
growth. Second, the turning-point in the trend occurs in the mid-1960s for the
United States and the mid-1980s for Italy, a delay of about two decades.
Empirical Results
The aim of this section is to estimate short- and long-run price and income
elasticities of tobacco demand in Italy from the post-unification years until
Figure 2 Secular trends in C, P, and Y
16The inter-war years registered a general reduction in international trade. For Italy, autarchy repre-
sented the new faith. Historical sources clearly show that the Italian imports of tobacco (both the leaves
and the manufactured products) fell considerably during the inter-war period.
17The rapid upturn occurring after the turn of the century admittedly appears odd. An explanation can
be found in Joossens and Raw (2008). These authors provide estimates of the amount of seized tobacco (in
tons) in Italy around the turn of the century, and find that from 1998 to 2002, legal cigarette sales in-
creased by 19% in Italy as a whole, by 121% in Campania, and by 55% in Apulia. The authors conclude
that illicit cigarette sales became largely unavailable during this period, forcing smokers to buy cigarettes
in legal markets. For more about estimating price elasticities when smuggling is present, see Gruber,
Sen, and Stabile(2003).
18Our data do not detect smuggling. Publicly available data on smuggling are scarce (Gilmore et al.
2014) and, in the Italian case, they refer only to the most recent years (Gallus et al. 2003). The available
information suggests that smuggling in Italy increased in the late 1980s, and accounted for 10% to 30%
of cigarette sales in the early 1990s (Gallus et al. 2003 and 2009). Smuggling then declined one decade
later due to increased control of the supply chain of cigarettes and to new decrees on smuggling enforced
in the early 2000s, but also due to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which led to stricter con-
trol of the Italian coasts. From 2000 onwards, interest in reliable smuggling data grew rapidly in Europe
(Joossens et al. 2014), leading to useful data collection. However, the time span of these data is too recent
to apply to the present study.
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2010. The following subsection deals with the empirical analysis of aggregate
tobacco demand, based on cointegration tests and an error-correction mecha-
nism (Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen 1988; Doornik 1998). Following that,
we further explore the pattern of consumption of the four major tobacco com-
ponents (snuff, cut tobacco, cigarettes and cigars) by estimating a complete
demand system. The purpose is to provide additional insights for the seem-
ingly iso-elastic demand function we observe over one and half centuries.
Aggregated Analysis
We proceed in two steps. First, the time series properties of the variables
are examined to determine their order of integration. A long-run relation-
ship of tobacco demand is then estimated via OLS:19
Ct ¼ a0 þ a1Yt þ a2Pt þ ut (1)
where Ct and Pt represent per-capita consumption and the real price of tobacco,
respectively, and Yt denotes real per-capita income (see ﬁgure 2). The stationar-
ity of the OLS residuals—veriﬁed with unit roots tests—is considered evidence
of an equilibrium relationship between C, Y, and P that are said to be
“cointegrated”. In the second step, the residuals of the cointegrating regression
are used as an explanatory variable in an error correction model (ECM):
DCt ¼ b0 þ b1DYt þ b2DPt þ b3u^t1 þ et (2)
where the parameter b3 of the error term u^t1 measures the extent to which
consumption tends to revert to long-run equilibrium. Table 1 complements
ﬁgure 2 and provides descriptive statistics for the physical consumption of
tobacco (C) in kilograms, real per-capita income (Y) in Euros, and real price
of tobacco (P) in Euro/kg.
Stationarity Tests and Cointegration Analysis
To determine whether the model variables are stationary (as well as their
order of integration) two alternative tests are used: ADF (Dickey and Fuller
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable
1871–1913 1919–1939 1946–2010
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Ct 1.621 0.117 1.673 0.184 2.430 0.491
Pt 0.006 0.001 0.014 0.004 0.016 0.004
Yt 0.741 0.138 1.060 0.077 3.310 1.486
Note: For a detailed description of the variables, see the previous section.
19The empirical literature provides different specifications of the demand functions (Cameron 1998;
Gallet and List 2003). The linear form is here preferred to the more popular double-log specification be-
cause it is not bound to having constant elasticities. This hardly seems a tenable assumption when using
very long time-series data, and factors that influence tobacco demand responsiveness have possibly
changed, even considerably.
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1979) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) unit root tests. The ADF test con-
sists of running the following regression:
Dyt ¼ lþ kt þ ayt1 þ
Xp
i¼1
ciDyti þ et (3)
and testing whether the coefﬁcient of yt1 is zero, that is, H0 : a ¼ 0 versus
H1 : a < 0. The number of augmenting lags p is chosen so as to ensure white
noise disturbances. The optimal lag length is selected according to modiﬁed
Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (SC) information criteria (Ng and Perron 2001).20
If the null of a unit root cannot be rejected, the test is repeated on the dif-
ferenced series to check whether one can reject a higher order of integration
in favor of I(1). The KPSS unit root test differs from the ADF test in that the
series yt is assumed to be stationary under the null hypothesis.21
The two test statistics indicate that the levels of the three series are non-
stationary. In contrast, when the first difference of the variables is examined,
the null hypothesis of a unit root process can be strongly rejected (see table
B.1 in the online supplementary appendix for details).22 Therefore, both tests
indicate consistently that the variables Ct, Pt, and Yt are best described as
nonstationary I(1) series.23
Given that Ct, Pt, and Yt are nonstationary I(1) series, we initially estimate
equation (1) via OLS. Cointegration is supported if the null of a unit root is
rejected for the OLS residuals. The estimated long-run relationship is shown
in table 2. Both real price and income variables confirm sign expectations
and significantly determine tobacco consumption in Italy in each sub-
period. Previous econometric studies (Chaloupka and Warner 2000; Saffer
and Chaloupka 1999) find negative and significant effects of qualitative and
control policy variables (e.g., smoking restrictions, a ban on smoking for
minors, health information, warning labels on packaging, and demographic
factors) on tobacco consumption. Accordingly, we have modelled such a po-
tential impact adding ad hoc dummies and a time trend in the long-run
regression. These proxies, however, were not statistically significant, and
eventually they were dropped to save degrees of freedom.24
20The critical values of the t-statistics, as well as the relevant p-values are based on MacKinnon (1996).
21The critical values of this test are based on Sephton (1995).
22The results for the second period (1919 to 1939) are reported for the sake of completeness. These results
are based only on 21 observations, which makes any conclusion in principle weak. Nonetheless, with the
caution of the case, the results of both type of tests show that the three series are nonstationary in the in-
termediate sub-period too.
23In the presence of structural change, though, the ADF-type tests cannot be considered conclusive in
that they are known to be biased towards the non-rejection of the null. Hence, we have formally tested for
unit roots in the presence of structural instability (Perron 1989). The results (available upon request) re-
veal that the unit root hypothesis receives support (at the 5% significance level) after considering a struc-
tural change effective at 1980. The break date coincides with a rapid increase in the real price of tobacco
(see figure 2). Plausibly, it also reflects the (much delayed) impact of international tobacco legislation and
smoking restrictions of the early 1960s on Italian consumers.
24The role of smuggling is also of concern. In the absence of available data, one way to control for smug-
gling when using a time series of aggregate data is to add the price of tobacco products in neighbouring
states among the explanatory variables of the demand equation, as in Baltagi and Levin (1986). Other
studies have made use of smuggling indices (Becker, Grossman and Murphy 1994) or proxies (Tiezzi
2005). In an attempt to control for smuggling, we added among the explanatory variables the quantity of
foreign tobacco consumed in Italy, in inverse ratio, used as a proxy of smuggling. We did not get signifi-
cant results. In addition, such a proxy was available only for the years 1972–2000.
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The residual-based ADF and KPSS test statistics (see table B.2 in the online
supplementary appendix for details) consistently indicate that the null of non-
stationarity of the residuals from the long-run relationship can be rejected at
the 5% level in both the first and second periods and at the 10% level in the
more recent period (1946 to 2010). Hence, based on the stationarity of the OLS
residuals it can be concluded that Ct, Pt, and Yt are cointegrated.
In principle, there could be multiple linear combinations of these variables
which are I(0). In order to determine the number of cointegrating vectors,
we have used the Johansen approach. In both the first and the last sub-
periods, the two statistics indicate that we can reject the null of no cointe-
grating relationships at the 1% significance level, and suggest that there
exists only one stationary relationship between the nonstationary variables
included in the model (the results of the trace test and the maximal
eigenvalue test are summarized in table B.3 in the online supplementary ap-
pendix). This finding supports the single-equation Engle-Granger approach.
Error Correction Model
We next turn to the estimation of the error correction model (Engle and
Granger 1987). Table 3 reports the OLS estimates. Given that all variables
are stationary, the standard test statistics do have the conventional limit dis-
tributions. All relevant coefficients have the expected sign and are statisti-
cally significant, with the exception of DYt, which, in the first period (1871 to
1913), does not significantly affect the changes in tobacco consumption.
Changes in lagged consumption DCt1, price DPt, and income DYt (in the re-
cent sub-period) are all statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, re-
spectively. The estimated ECM coefficients are negative and significant in
all periods, indicating that the null of the cointegrating hypothesis is not
rejected at the 5% level, and that the demand for tobacco partially reverts to
long-run equilibrium after any short-run imbalance. The speed of adjust-
ment, though, differs strongly between periods.
The ECM model appears to be well-specified since it passes a list of stan-
dard diagnostic tests. The only discordant finding is the Ramsey’s RESET
Table 2 Estimated Cointegration Relationships
Variable 1871–1913 1919–1939 1946–2010
Constant 1.823*** 1.106*** 2.786***
Pt 155.451*** 27.778*** 78.935***
Yt 1.080*** 0.417** 0,338***
R2 0.842 0.928 0.866
F-statistic 90.381*** 93.519*** 86.430***
Diagnostic Tests Value Value Value
Serial correlation 6.361*** 0.975 46.495***
Normality 0.496 1.428 1.184
Misspeciﬁcation 0.567 0.441 0.698
Stability 0.511 1.446 1.330
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Serial cor-
relation: Breusch-Godfrey test; Normality: Doornik-Hansen test; Misspeciﬁcation: Ramsey RESET test;
Stability: Harvey-Collier t-statistic.
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test in the first period, which shows that there is some departure from the
null of the maintained model.
Price and Income Elasticities
Table 4 reports elasticity estimates at the sample mean of the relevant pe-
riod. The estimated elasticities have the expected signs, that is, the demand
for tobacco is negatively (positively) related to price (income) both in the
short and in the long run. Second, the short-run elasticities are always
smaller (in absolute terms) than the response in the long-run, as expected
when dealing with the consumption of addictive goods. Third, changes in
income tend to affect tobacco consumption only in the long-run (all short-
run income elasticities are numerically negligible and not significant).
Indeed, in the long run tobacco is a normal good and its responsiveness to
income is more or less constant over time (from 0.49 to 0.46). Fourth, esti-
mates of both short- and long-run elasticities confirm that tobacco demand
is inelastic to its own price, and increasingly so over time (0.48 and 0.62,
Table 4 Estimated Demand Elasticities
Elasticity 1871–1913 1919–1939 1946–2010
Price Short-run 0.477 (0.118) 0.248 (0,081) 0.349 (0.101)
Long-run 0.615 (0.033) 0.422 (0.026) 0.505 (0.118)
Income Short-run 0.125 (0.101) 0.047 (0.061) 0.216 (0.121)
Long-run 0.494 (0.044) 0.264 (0.104) 0.461 (0.062)
Note: Values are at the sample mean. Approximate asymptotic standard errors appear in parentheses.
Table 3 Estimated ECM Relationship
Variable 1871–1913 1919–1939 1946–2010
Constant 0.004 0.002 0.013
DCt1 0.467*** 0.420*** 0.349***
DPt 120.486*** 17.274*** 54.590***
DPt1 64.225** 2.134
DPt2 62.798** 5.620
DYt 0.274 0.110 0.158*
DYt1 0.395** 0.066
DYt2 0.810** 0.075
u^t1 0.432** 0.582*** 0.120***
R2 0.521 0.753 0.470
F-statistic 4.733*** 38.051*** 7.655***
Diagnostic Tests Value Value Value
Serial correlation 2.194 0.088 0.352
Normality 4.019 1.957 0.560
Misspeciﬁcation 13.326*** 2.661 0.039
Stability 1.553 0.602 0.521
Note: Asterisks ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Serial cor-
relation: Breusch-Godfrey test; Normality: Doornik-Hansen test; Misspeciﬁcation: Ramsey RESET test;
Stability: Harvey-Collier t-statistic.
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respectively, in the first period, and 0.35 and 0.51, respectively, in the
last period).
For the recent period (1946 to 2010), our estimates appear in line with
those reported in the international literature, with the prevailing values of
price elasticities ranging between 0.3 and 0.5 (Cameron 1998; Chaloupka
and Warner 2000; Gallet and List 2003). Turning to the Italian case, previous
studies find price elasticities with a median value of 0.41 and 0.75 for the
short- and long-run cases, respectively (Jones and Giannoni-Mazzi 1996;
Rizzi 2000; Escario and Molina 2001; Gallus et al. 2003; Tiezzi 2005; Pierani
and Tiezzi 2009). Finally, the work by Nguyen, Rosenqvist, and Pekurinen
(2012), which is close in spirit to our approach, presents estimates of the
short-run price and income elasticities of cigarette demand of 0.373 and
0.098, respectively (although the latter is not statistically significant).
Figure 3 accounts for the temporal profile of price and income elasticities. The
bold lines, always above zero, represent long-run income elasticities, while the
dotted lines, always below zero, refer to long-run price elasticities.25 Income elas-
ticities are always within the interval [0.25, 1], making tobacco a normal good.
This result should be taken with a grain of salt. Aggregate time series may not
be the appropriate data to identify the true income elasticity for tobacco prod-
ucts, and the positive income elasticities found in this study may possibly be
caused by other unobservables. For example, one would expect that the spread
of information about the health consequences of smoking, antismoking activities
and admonitions on packaging in the second half of the more recent period
should have reduced the income elasticity of tobacco products.26
Turning to price elasticities, even from a secular perspective, the long-run
price elasticity of tobacco has remained in the range of 0.62 to 0.51. This
finding seems peculiar when one considers how radically the perspective of
both Italian policy makers and consumers regarding tobacco has changed
over time. Such a twist is well-represented by the inverted U-shape of the
price elasticity of demand in the third sub-period starting at 0.62 in 1948,
reaching a threshold value of 0.19 in 1980, and going back to 0.61 by
Figure 3 Time path of long-run elasticities
25Estimated elasticities are always significant because confidence intervals (not shown here) never in-
clude zero. The time series of long-run elasticities, shown in figure 3, were obtained by extrapolating, sep-
arately for each sub-period, the estimated coefficients a1 and a2 of equation (1).
26Respondent-level cross-sectional data may be better suited for this task. For example, in a very interest-
ing study, Binkley (2010) investigates the relationship between income and smoking, developing a model
in which income serves both as budget constraint and as a source of future utility. This author’s results
suggest that poor health behaviour by low-income consumers may be economically rational. Moreover,
given that the great reduction of the smoking population that has occurred over the last decades has been
smaller for those with less income, cigarettes have switched from being a normal to being an inferior
good.
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2008. Between 1946 and 1980, smoking behavior in Italy was still a status
symbol associated with female emancipation, subliminal movie messages
and cultural transformation, but not yet associated with health problems.
From 1980 onwards, though, the growing concerns about the negative
health consequences as well as the coming into effect of the anti-smoking
laws might have caused the elasticity to increase again.27 Thus, the inverted
U-shaped price elasticity of demand may well reflect the shift of tobacco
from a sort of conspicuous habit to a social stigma.
Disaggregated Analysis
In this section we investigate patterns of per-capita expenditure on the
four tobacco products. The evolution of per-capita consumption on the four
tobacco products is shown in figure 4. In the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century, the largest expenditure share was on cigars, fol-
lowed by cut tobacco, but their consumption gradually declined over time
to around zero. Expenditure on cigarettes was low in the late nineteenth
century, but increased to 2.5% of total outlay (amounting to over 96% of the
expenditure on tobacco products) in the most recent years.
In fact, as shown by figure 5, over time there has been an almost total replace-
ment of the other tobacco products by cigarettes. Indeed, in 1871 snuff, cut to-
bacco, and cigars covered 99% of tobacco expenditure, but in 2010 cigarettes
represented 97% of such expenditure. The historical shift in individual preferen-
ces and habits with regard to tobacco products explains these trends. For exam-
ple, the use of chewing tobacco and snuff was reduced by anti-spitting laws
enacted in the late 1800s and early 1900s, which were intended to minimize the
spread of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases (O’Connor 2011).
In recent decades, the health hazards of active and passive smoking have
been definitively recognized, and smoking behavior has increasingly become
stigmatized. Smokeless tobacco (e.g., snuff) does not imply passive smoking,
and therefore it may carry less social stigma than smoking. It is thus of particu-
lar interest to explore the substitution relationships between smoking (ciga-
rettes, cigars, and cut tobacco) and smokeless (snuff) types of tobacco.
Figure 4 Per-capita consumption of tobacco in Italy: major components, 1871–2010 (kg)
27The first anti-smoking law in Italy was Law n. 584/1975, enacted on November 11, 1975, which pro-
hibited smoking on public means of transportation, in hospitals, theatres, museums, universities, and
public libraries.
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To provide information on substitution/complementarity relationships,
we compute own and cross-price elasticities for the four tobacco products
from the parameters of a complete demand system, which includes a com-
posite commodity for the remaining nondurables. The demand system was
estimated separately for the three periods 1871–1913, 1919–1939 and 1946–
2010. The functional form chosen is the well-known Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS; Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). The estimated demand func-
tions are the following budget shares:
wit ¼ ai þ
X
j
cijlnpjt þ biln YtPt
 
þ uit (4)
where Yt is total expenditure in year t, pjt is the price of the jth tobacco prod-
uct, Pt is approximated by the Stone linear price index, deﬁned as
lnPt ¼
P
i wilnpit, the parameters cij are deﬁned as cij¼1/2(cij þ cji)¼cji, and
uitis the stochastic error term. A linear time trend is also included. From the
demand system (4), the matrix of uncompensated price and income elastici-
ties can be calculated, as in Green and Alston (1990). Along the lines of our
previous aggregate analysis, we investigate here the time series properties
of variables used in equation (4), that is, budget shares in levels, prices in
logarithms, and a measure of per-capita income deﬂated by the Stone price
index in order to specify the correct dynamic speciﬁcation (Attﬁeld 1997).
Both the ADF and Phillips-Perron test statistics suggest that the unit root hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level of signiﬁcance for each variable
included in equation (4). The next step is to test the hypothesis of cointegra-
tion using the Engle and Granger (1987) methodology. We ﬁnd evidence of
stationary OLS residuals and conclude that all the variables in equations (4)
are I(1) and cointegrated. The estimated ECM is:
Dwit ¼ niDwit1 þ
X
j
cijDlnpjt þ biDln YtPt
 
 kilit1 þ eit (5)
where lit1 are the estimated residuals from cointegrating equations (4). The
estimate of the error correction terms ki are all statistically signiﬁcant and
Figure 5 Tobacco expenditure: budget shares, 1871–2010
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
14Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/aepp/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/aepp/ppx047/4658767
by Universita Degli Studi user
on 05 April 2018
have the correct signs, indicating that deviations from long-run equilibrium
are corrected within the time period.28 Table 5 shows long-run and short-
run uncompensated (Marshallian) price and income elasticities, along with
their standard errors derived from the estimated parameters of equations (4)
and (5), respectively, (using the ﬁtted budget shares calculated at the sample
mean of the investigation periods, i.e., 1871–1913, 1919–1939, and 1946–
2009).29,30 Here, we focus on the most interesting equilibrium, that is, own
and cross-price elasticities and their pattern over time (table 5). The last col-
umn displays each commodity’s income elasticity of demand. All own-price
elasticities in the long run are signiﬁcant, with the correct sign, and satisfy
the theoretical properties. The long-run price elasticity of cigarettes goes
from 0.811 in the pre-war period to 0.253 in the latest period, indicating
that cigarettes are an increasingly price-inelastic good. This pattern is consis-
tent both with the literature (Gallet and List 2003) and with our ﬁndings.
The long-run price elasticity of cigars seems rather stable over time, going
from 0.660 in the ﬁrst time period to 0.676 in the most recent period.
Own price elasticities for snuff and cut tobacco are not relevant in the third
period because the budget shares for these products amount to almost zero.
Overall, these patterns are consistent with a story of gradual substitution for
other tobacco products by cigarettes, driven by the secular changes in pref-
erences described above.
Substitution relationships are particularly interesting for both their public
finance and public health implications. When faced with price differentials,
consumers may substitute a related product for the desired one, for exam-
ple, cut tobacco used for roll-your-own (RYO) cigarettes replacing packed
cigarettes. In principle, public policy could manipulate such substitution be-
havior by setting the tax structure so as to meet policy goals, such as incen-
tivizing smokers to adopt less hazardous forms of tobacco. Smoked tobacco
other than cigarettes, such as cigars and cut tobacco used for RYO, have
now been shown to pose similar health burdens (O’Connor 2011). However,
smokeless tobacco products such as snuff or chewing tobacco do not involve
passive smoking and may therefore be preferable for public health
purposes.
Focusing on long-run cross-price elasticities, table 5 shows that cigars be-
come an increasingly strong substitute for cut tobacco over time (0.148 in
the first sub-period; 0.510 in the third sub-period) and a strong complement
of cigarettes in the third sub-period (1.078). On the other hand, cigarettes
are a weaker complement of cigars (0.009 in the first sub-period and
0.024 in the third sub-period), meaning that the demand for cigarettes
declines much less following an increase in the price of cigars than the de-
cline in the demand for cigars following an increase in the price of cigarettes.
As expected, smokeless tobacco (snuff) in the first investigation period is a
substitute for smoked tobacco (cigarettes and cut). In the last investigation
period we instead find a strong complementarity between snuff and ciga-
rettes (1.772). These last results have to be considered with caution given
the negligible budget share of snuff tobacco. At the same time, cigarette
28Results of unit root tests and ECM estimation are available from the authors upon request.
29Estimates of short-run elasticities are obtained using the same formulas as described in Green and
Alston (1990) and the estimated parameters of equation (5), while their long-run counterparts use the es-
timated parameters of the cointegration equations (4).
30As stressed previously, the results for the second period (1919–1939) are reported for the sake of com-
pleteness. Given the low number of observations (21) any conclusion is in principle weak.
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consumption is insensitive to variations in the price of other products.31 The
disaggregated analysis thus highlights a clear replacement of both smokeless
and smoked tobacco by cigarettes over time. We also used the Slutzky equa-
tion to decompose the cross-price elasticities for the period 1946–2010 into the
Hicksian price effect and the income effect.32 We find substitution among the
four tobacco products in the short run and complementarity in the long run.
One interpretation of this finding is that smokers start as single-product con-
sumers and turn to other tobacco products in the short run after a price in-
crease in their preferred tobacco product. However, each tobacco product
may serve as a gateway to nicotine addiction such that multiple tobacco prod-
uct use becomes more prevalent in the long run.
Implications
An almost stable price elasticity of demand for tobacco over one-and-a-half
centuries is a novelty considering that prices and quantity consumed have
changed dramatically over the last 150 years. This finding mimics an iso-
elastic demand curve for which the price elasticity of demand does not vary
with price and quantity. As long as the constant price elasticity of demand g
is less than one, a price increase will always increase total expenditures.33 An
increasing expenditure level over time, coupled with a structure of tobacco
taxation predominantly based on ad valorem taxation, has guaranteed a
growing flow of public revenues from tobacco until 2003.34 The structure of
tobacco taxation has played an important role in producing this desirable
public finance outcome.35 In competitive markets, specific and ad valorem
taxes have identical consequences (Myles 1996). In the presence of monopoly,
instead, ad valorem taxation leads to higher public revenues (Keen 1998) and
lower prices. This explains the historical preference of the Italian government
for ad valorem taxation. The existence of a public monopoly of tobacco in
Italy between 1862 and 2003 has implied that the institution setting the price
and determining the structure of commodity taxation was the same (the
state), producing a taxation structure—in particular of cigarettes—that was
heavily distorted in favor of ad valorem taxation (Manzioni, Pandimiglio, and
Spallone 2011; Liberati and Paradiso 2014; Crespi et al. 2015).36
31Even though there is a huge body of literature on tobacco demand, only a few studies have estimated to-
bacco product demand in a system framework. Zheng et al. (2016) is an exception. The purpose of their
study and the demand system composition is different from our own, though we can still make some com-
parisons. We find a long-run own price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in a similar range (0.495 in
Zheng et al. 2016). Both in Zheng et al. (2016) and in our study, cigarettes are by far the most price-in-
elastic among tobacco products.
32We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting using the Slutzky decomposition to deepen the analy-
sis of substitution and complementarities relationships.
33To see this, consider the following iso-elastic demand function:Q ¼ Apgwhere Q is quantity
demanded and p is price. Total expenditure is: pQ ¼ pApg ¼ Ap1g. Take g ¼ 0:5 for example. Total
expenditure pQ ¼ A ﬃﬃﬃpp always increases with p and is independent of Q. So an iso-elastic demand func-
tion with price elasticity less than one ensures increasing expenditures following a price increase even
when quantity demanded is decreasing.
34In 2003 the management of the Italian market for tobacco passed from public monopoly to a private
company named British and American Tobacco.
35Commodity taxation can mainly take the form either of specific or of ad valorem taxation. A specific tax
(or unit tax) is defined as a fixed amount per unit of the taxed good or service, whereas an ad valorem tax
is defined as a proportion of the product price and so, in effect, a tax on the sales value (Hines 2008).
36In the most recent years the share of ad valorem over total excise taxation in Italy was 0.87 (Crespi
et al. 2015).
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The balance between ad valorem and specific taxation bears, however, im-
portant implications for public revenue certainty and stability. It is easily
shown (Kay and Keen 1983; Keen 1998) that, when demand is iso-elastic, the
optimal condition for stabilizing public revenues requires the share of ad va-
lorem over total taxation to be equal to the price elasticity of demand.37 In
mathematical terms,
vp
t þ vp ¼ g
where g is the price elasticity of demand (deﬁned as non-negative), vp is the
product between the rate of ad valorem tax (a proportion of the consumer
price) and the consumer price p, and t is the rate of speciﬁc taxation (a ﬁxed
amount per unit of the commodity).38 If, for a given structure of commodity
taxation, vptþvp > g, a price increase will decrease public revenues; if, instead,vp
tþvp < g, a price increase will increase public revenues.
Italian governments have increased the share of ad valorem taxation over
total taxation over time for the reasons explained above. Nowadays, how-
ever, the left-hand-side term of the optimality condition is around 0.90 and
the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand, as found in our study, is
around 0.5. Public revenues from tobacco excise taxation are actually de-
creasing (Marzioni, Pandimiglio, and Spallone 2011; Liberati and Paradiso
2014) and the share of ad valorem taxation should be reduced to meet the
optimality condition for revenue stability. A different combination of to-
bacco taxation is desirable for other reasons as well. Kay and Keen (1983)
show that ad valorem taxation should be used to correct non-price aspects
of market performance (such as issues of quality and product variety), while
specific taxation most powerfully affects prices and thus should be used to
discourage consumption and reduce negative externalities. Furthermore,
when externalities are large enough to require a policy intervention, the op-
timal tax structure switches immediately to wholly specific excise taxation
(Pirttil€a 1997). Empirical support is offered by Chaloupka et al. (2010), who
provide evidence that cigarette consumption is less affected by an increase
in an ad valorem excise tax than by a comparable increase in a specific excise
tax. Thus, the reasons that the Italian tax authorities have adduced in the
most recent years to justify high rates of taxation on tobacco—such as the
desire to discourage consumption and its negative externalities—are the sort
37Following Key and Keen (1982), consider public revenues from taxation as given by the following equa-
tion: R ¼ t þ vpð ÞQ, where R is public revenues from taxation, Q is quantity demanded (which depends
on price), t is the rate of specific taxation, and vp is the product between the rate of ad valorem taxation
and the price. By setting the derivative of this equation with respect to p to zero, we obtain: dRdp ¼ t dQdp þ v
p dQdp þ vQ ¼ 0 or t þ vpð Þ dQdp ¼ vQ.
Multiplying both sides by pQ , we obtain the optimality condition:
vp
tþvpð Þ ¼ dQdp pQ ¼ g.
38The maximizing condition neglects the fact that a change in the price of cigarettes, for example, will
typically affect expenditure on the other tobacco products. The strength and direction of this effect
depends on both the rates at which the other goods are taxed and the magnitude and sign of cross-price
effects (Keen 1998). If two goods are complements, say, then the larger the absolute value of the cross-
price elasticity, the larger the ratio of ad valorem taxation over total excise taxation in order to preserve
constancy of the overall tax revenues. As a matter of fact, snuff and cut tobacco were both complements
to cigarettes in the third sub-period (table 5). Changes in cigarette prices thus affected not only cigarette
consumption, but also expenditures on snuff and cut tobacco. This allowed the government to further in-
crease ad valorem excise taxation preserving constancy of the overall tax revenues.
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of arguments that should prompt high rates of specific rather than ad valo-
rem taxation.
Conclusions
Traditionally, Italian policy makers have considered tobacco as a major
source of public revenues while its health-related issues have been ignored
altogether. Historical sources explicitly document the government’s goal of
increasing the level of domestic tobacco consumption to that prevailing in
other European countries. However, society’s opinion on tobacco consump-
tion, in Italy as elsewhere, has changed dramatically over time. Our statisti-
cal analysis identifies the early 1980s as the period marking the reversal of
the rising trend that started soon after the Second World War.
In light of these considerations, it was somewhat surprising to find,
throughout our secular investigation (1871–2010), long-run price elasticities
in the range of 0.6 to 0.5 at the sample mean, and also evidence that de-
mand is nowadays becoming increasingly inelastic when growing health
concerns could have triggered the opposite trend.39
Interestingly, it seems that Italian governments have for a long time been
able to exploit this demand behavior for rising public revenues. However,
the optimal condition for stabilizing public revenues from tobacco taxation
does not seem to hold in the most recent years of our analysis, and this
change of environment calls for a change in the taxation structure of tobacco
products.
Our analysis also reveals an increasingly strong and asymmetric separa-
bility between cigarettes and other products, that is, while cigarette demand
is insensitive to price variations in the other tobacco products, the converse
does not hold. Public policy could exploit these cross-product relationships
to incentivize the desired consumption behavior. Since smokeless forms of
tobacco do not carry the same health hazards that passive smoking does, an
active role in triggering desirable substitution or complementarity relation-
ships could be played by introducing tax differentials for the different to-
bacco products.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at Applied Economic Perspectives and
Policy online.
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